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EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. By 
Warwick McKean. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1983. Pp. 333. $65. 
Equality and Discrimination Under International Law is a history 
of the development of the twin principles of individual equality and 
non-discrimination in international law. Warwick McKean1 con-
vincingly establishes that under international interpretation the con-
cept of equality means a normative, or substantive equality, which 
includes affirmative action, and does not mean a strictly mathemati-
cal, or formal, equality of treatment. McKean also establishes that 
in international usage the term "discrimination" means an invidious 
or arbitrary distinction. He shows that according to the international 
principles of equality and non-discrimination, undertaking _special 
measures to help a certain group reach substantive equality with 
other groups is not discriminatory, but rather is an essential 
obligation. 
McKean's stated objective is to "discover the extent to which 
there exist international norms, or standards of international law 
concerning the equality of individuals" (p. 13). His book is a wide-
ranging examination of the international formulations of the equal-
ity and non-discrimination principles since the first World War, 
through which he demonstrates the principles' basic content and 
their establishment in international law. He offers less adequate evi-
dence for determining whether the principles constitute international 
legal standards, legal norms, or parts of the jus cogens - and thus 
1. Warwick McKean is a Fellow of St. John's College Cambridge. He has taught at the 
Unviersities of Oxford and Otago, and at the Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. 
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how binding they are on states - but he does suggest convincingly 
that the principles partake of at least one of the three. The strength 
of Equality and .Discrimination Under International Law lies in the 
insight it gives into the content of the equality and non-discrimina-
tion principles, but the book also marks a start toward further exami-
nation of the twin principles' legal status as they evolve in 
international law. 
McKean begins his analysis of the equality and non-discrimina-
tion principles with the post-World War I treaties that were to guar-
antee the rights of national minorities and that were signed under 
the auspices of the League of Nations. Although the treaties were a 
practical failure and in fact became a focus for irredentist agitation, 
they were significant because they introduced the notion of special 
protection into the principle of equality of treatment of minorities. 
For example, the treaties provided that if minorities are to be equal 
they must be allowed to choose schools taught in their mother 
tongue (p. 22). 
Since the failure of the League, the United Nations has been the 
most important forum for the development of the equality and non-
discrimination principles. The UN Charter affirmed that individuals 
should enjoy certain basic rights and that these rights should be se-
cured to all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. 
In addition, Article 13 of the Charter directed the General Assembly 
to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of 
'assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or reli-
gion' " (p. 54). 
Within this general mandate to protect human rights, the United 
Nations, through various organs, has produced many significant 
documents developing the twin principles. The first important docu-
ment prepared under UN auspices was the Universal Declaration of 
Human rights, adopted by the Commission on Human Rights and 
proclaimed as a UN resolution in 1948. It provided essentially that 
all people would be entitled to certain fundamental rights without 
distinction of any kind, and that there would be both equal protec-
tion for all under member states' national laws, and freedom from 
discrimination under those laws. Since its proclamation by the UN 
General Assembly, the Universal Declaration has been one of the 
most constantly recited resolutions, referred to and incorporated in 
numerous UN resolutions and conventions. McKean argues that the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination contained in the Ulll;-
versal Declaration have through "widespread and constant recogni-
tion [been] clothed with the character of customary law" (p. 274). It 
fell to later UN organs to develop the meaning of the principles con-
910 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:902 
tained in the Universal Declaration.2 
The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and 
the Protection of Minorities produced much of the theoretical work 
behind the Universal Declaration and has since produced several 
"immensely valuable" studies that have elucidated the "meaning 
and content of the principles of equality and non-discrimination, 
and have established several general principles" (p. 94). These stud-
ies have defined the concept of equality to include special measures 
for the disadvantaged, and have described discrimination as an in-
vidious and arbitrary distinction. Further, they have described 
grounds and considerations for determining what actions are 
discriminatory. 
In McKean's view, the fruition of the Sub-Commission's theoret-
ical work is the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, the "most radical instrument so far adopted" 
(p. 165) under UN auspices in the field of human rights. The Con-
vention prohibits racial discrimination while carefully distinguishing 
from the prohibition special measures designed to secure the ad-
vancement of under-privileged racial groups.3 In addition, the Con-
vention requires state parties to take affirmative action to "ensure the 
adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or in-
dividuals" (p. 158). For McKean, including ''the notion of special 
temporary measures" (p. 159) to aid minorities within the definition 
of discrimination illustrates how discrimination and minority protec-
tion can be "fused into the principle of equality" (p. 159). The af-
firmative obligations imposed on the state parties to take immediate 
action to terminate racial discrimination within their jurisdictions 
and to take special measures "to ensure the 'full and equal' enjoy-
ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms" are seen by Mc-
Kean to be the most important aspects of the Convention (p. 165). 
In addition to UN work on the equality and non-discrimination 
principles, McKean examines the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which he calls the "most gener-
ally effective" procedure for protecting human rights (p. 204), the 
jurisprudence of the European Human Rights Court, and the juris-
2. Primary authority for development of the principles fell to the Commission on Human 
Rights, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention 
of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities. Pp. 72-87. 
3. United Nations practice . . . endorses the view that the equality principle permits 
and sometimes requires differences of treatment so long as four conditions are satisfied: 
(1) The differential treatment must consist of protective measures designed to promote the 
welfare of a particular indigenous group; (2) It must be wanted by such groups; (3) It must 
be based on the needs of a particular group and not its race or colour classification; (4) It 
must not be continued for longer than is strictly necessary. Should any of these conditions 
not be satisfied then the differential treatment will be invidious and therefore 
discriminatory. 
P. 91. 
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prudence of the United States and Indian Supreme Courts. He gen-
erally approves of the European Court's interpretation of the 
equality and non-discrimination principles but criticizes the Euro-
pean Convention for not providing a general guarantee of equality 
before the law (found to be too vague for many member states), and 
for providing instead for protection only against the infringement of 
those rights specifically set out in the Convention. He notes that the 
European Court also interprets "discrimination" to mean invidious 
and arbitrary distinction, and "equality" to be used in its normative 
rather than its mathematical sense (pp. 204-227). He criticizes the 
United States Supreme Court's equal protection clause interpreta-
tion, which has tied affirmative action to compensation for past 
wrongs and has failed to permit special measures based solely on an 
obligation to achieve present substantive equality and justice. He 
also criticizes the concept of "reverse discrimination" as a confusion 
of terminology. He argues that if the Supreme Court would follow 
the international principle of normative rather than formal equality, 
and the international definition of discrimination, it would encoun-
ter no difficulties in upholding special measures for disadvantaged 
groups under the fourteenth amendment.4 
After tracing the development of the equality and non-discrimi-
nation principles, McKean turns his attention to their legal status in 
international law. McKean offers three ways of viewing the princi-
ples: as legal standards, as norms, or as parts of the jus co gens. A 
legal standard is a "category of indeterminate reference" (p. 265), 
such as reasonableness, that provides guidance in situations in which 
a precise legal rule gives no definitive answer. Such standards have 
their roots in the "mores of the day" (p. 265) .. McKean argues, based 
on the South West Africa cases,5 that the U.N. equality and non-
discrimination principles are evidence of legal standards to which all 
member states should be held. 
The South West Africa cases, brought by two African countries 
before the International Court of Justice,6 presented the question of 
whether the policy of apartheid violates an international human 
4. The Fourteenth Amendment must be read both to further general equality regard-
less of race and to permit affirmative action for certain groups regardless of individual 
disadvantage so long as the group remains disadvantaged. To describe affirmative action 
as discrimination and therefore contrary to the principle of equality enshrined in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to confuse terminology .... If a 'discrimination per se,' i.e. 
distinction, is reasonable and designed to further real and genuine (normative) equality 
then it is valid. 
P. 245. 
5. See [1971] I.C.J. 16; [1966] I.C.J. 6; [1962] I.C.J. 319 (preliminary objections); [1950] 
I.C.J. 148. 
6. The plaintiffs asked the Court to determine if South Africa was still bound by its Man-
date from the League of Nations and whether it had breached its obligations if the Mandate 
was still in force. The cases were dismissed for lack of standing, but the judges discussed many 
of the issues raised in the complaints in the majority and minority opinions. 
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rights norm, or whether an international human rights standard ex-
ists by which South Africa's Mandate to administer the territory of 
South West Africa must be interpreted. Both the minority and ma-
jority judges agreed that the Mandate must be interpreted with re-
spect to international standards, and that the consensus of the world 
community (as has been expressed in various United Nations fo-
rums) must be examined in order to discover the substance of the 
standard. McKean argues that, in a similar fashion, equality and 
non-discrimination standards developed in UN resolutions, declara-
tions and conventions should also be used to interpret the UN Char-
ter itself, and thereby bind all member states (pp. 269-70). How 
much force the standards may have, however, turns on whether they 
are "authoritative" or merely "guide[s] to interpretation" (p. 270). 
McKean cannot say for certain which of these the equality and non-
discrimination principles are. He does, however, argue that although 
the Universal Declaration is probably not an authoritative interpre-
tation of the Charter, and therefore not binding, it, along with the 
other UN pronouncements on equality and non-discrimination, 
must at least be given substantial weight as a guide to Charter 
interpretation. 
A second possible status of the twin principles is that they are 
legal norms. Judge Jessup, in the majority opinion to the South West 
Africa cases, rejected this status on the ground that international 
bodies are not legislative in character and cannot create law by reso-
lution. McKean asserts however, that even if the UN cannot create 
new rules of law, UN practice may be strong evidence of customary 
law. As noted earlier, McKean argues at several points that consid-
erable authority supports the notion that the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the principles of equality and non-discrimina-
tion they contain are now customary international law. 
McKean also takes up the possibility that the principles of equal-
ity and non-discrimination are part of the jus cogens, a group of se-
lect rules of law that have become so fundamental that they cannot 
be abridged by individual states without seriously affecting the "very 
essence" of the legal system (pp. 277-78). It is generally agreed that 
the principle of jus co gens in international law covers genocide and 
slavery, and Judge Tanaka in the minority opinion to the South West 
Africa cases asserted that if jus co gens exists at all then "surely the 
law concerning the protection of human rights may be considered to 
belong to [it]" (p. 281). McKean agrees. He argues that genocide 
and slavery are merely extreme examples of violations of the basic 
principles of equality and non-discrimination, and that in view of 
the nature of the latter as "fundamental constituents of the interna-
tional law of human rights, [they] are part ofthejus cogens" (p. 283). 
McKean's arguments for the precise status of the twin principles 
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of equality and non-discrimination are less convincing than those for 
the existence and content of the principles. In fact, they draw most 
of their strength from the weight of the book's thorough study of the 
establishment of principles in international law. Equality and Dis-
crimination Under International Law is essentially a history, and as 
such the concluding chapter on legal status is limited by the lack of 
material clearly supporting one possible status over another. Mc-
Kean is able to convincingly establish the existence of principles of 
equality and discrimination and to elucidate their content, but he is 
only able to propose tentative answers to the question of the princi-
ples' force as law. 
